Using cellular automata, the authors show how mutual influences among elements of self-relevant information give rise to dynamism, differentiation, and global evaluation in self-concept. The model assumes a press for integration that promotes internally generated dynamics and enables the self-structure to operate as a self-organizing dynamical system. When this press is set at high values, the self can resist inconsistent information and reestablish equilibrium after being perturbed by such information. A weak press for integration, on the other hand, impairs self-organization tendencies, making the system vulnerable to external information. Paradoxically, external information of a random nature may enhance the emergence of a stable self-structure in an initially disordered system. The simulation results suggest that important global properties of the self reflect the operation of integration processes that are generic in complex systems.
populate the self-system, meanwhile, are unique in that they are frequently derived from social experiences, revolving to a considerable degree around real and imagined relationships with specific and generalized others (cf. Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934; Rogers, 1961) . The uniqueness of the self is apparent as well in its role as an organizing force in other psychological structures and as an agent of control for important personal and interpersonal processes. In recognition of the unique and pervasive nature of the self, theorists and researchers have identified a number of processes that are specific to the self and make it unlike other psychological structures. Phenomena such as self-esteem maintenance (Tesser, 1988) , self-verification (Swann, 1990) , selfaffirmation (Steele, 1988) , self-deception (Our & Sackheim, 1979) , self-conscious emotions (Tangney & Fischer, 1995) , identity maintenance (Brewer & Kramer, 1985) , and self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1996) attest to the special nature of the self-structure.
None of these defining aspects and processes of the self would be possible without at least some semblance of integration among self-relevant elements. Before one can verify one's self-concept or maintain a level of self-esteem, after all, one must have a relatively coherent perspective on the vast number of features relevant to self-understanding. It is critical, then, to appreciate the means by which specific cognitive and affective elements are integrated in service of coherent self-understanding. Processes of integration are not unique to the self-system. To the contrary, the issue of how distinct elements become coordinated to form a coherent structure constitutes one of the main challenges facing contemporary science (cf. Schuster, 1984) . Theory and research on nonlinear dynamical systems have had remarkable success in addressing this challenge across diverse disciplines, from physics to economics.
This work has established that many important features of the integration process do not depend on the identity of elements per se, but rather on the nature of the interactions among elements, and that these features are invariant across otherwise distinct phenomena and levels of analysis (cf. Weisbuch, 1991) .
In this article, we hope to show that investigating the self as a complex dynamical system leads to a variety of insights regarding self-structure and self-process, some that resonate with phenomena that have already been established empirically and others that may establish a research agenda for future empirical work. We begin by developing the analogy between self and society. Issues of structure and process in social systems have been broached successfully from a dynamical systems perspective in recent years (e.g., Messick & Liebrand, 1995; Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990) , and because of the formal similarity among systems at different levels of analysis, it may prove fruitful to extend this general approach to the self-system. We then describe a cellular automata model of the self-system and investigate the model's potential for capturing the essence of integrative processes in self-understanding. This platform is then used to simulate the response of the self-system to incoming information (e.g., social feedback) as a function of the system's existing organization and the strength of the press for integration. In a concluding section, we summarize the advantages of viewing the self from an explicitly dynamical perspective and suggest lines of future theoretical and empirical work.
Self-Structure and Dynamics

Self and Society
The "society of self" metaphor can be viewed in the context of the broader analogy between mind and society, which provides a backdrop for both classic and contemporary theoretical frameworks. Various scholars, for example, have argued that groups and societies have a "collective mind" that functions in an analogous way to individual minds. Le Bon (1895 Bon ( /1968 was especially vehement on this point, insisting that groups think and feel in ways that are not reducible to the thoughts and feelings of individual group members. Contemporary perspectives have provided more explicit (and correspondingly less mystical) accounts of the analogy between mind and society. The model of transactive memory (Wegner, 1986) , for example, is based on the idea that social groups are directly analogous to minds with respect to the storage and distribution of information and memories. In this view, the development of a role structure in groups (e.g., dyads) reflects the same basic principles as the development of a differentiated cognitive structure in individuals.
Although mind has traditionally provided the frame of reference for models of group and societal processes, recent work has reversed the direction of the analogy, with society providing a metaphor for mind. This metaphor was given explicit expression by Minsky (1985) , in his seminal work, Society of Mind. Minsky argued that the mind is modular, with many relatively simple components performing specific tasks in a parallel fashion. None of the modular components are themselves intelligent; rather, intelligence is an emergent product resulting from the coordinated interaction among the components. In the same way that societies cannot be reduced to component individuals without characterizing the functional relations among them, the mind cannot be reduced to separate mechanisms without taking into account their mutual influence and coordination. Thus, different cognitive functions are performed by specific structures that function in parallel but interact to produce higher order structures with emergent properties. As Minsky notes, this progressive integration of cognitive functions is similar on a formal level to societal organization. Thus, mutual influences among individuals lead to the emergence of societal-level phenomena such as norms, public opinion, and cultural values.
The essence of both mental and social structures is captured by connectionist models (cf. Read & Miller, 1998) , which suggest that complex functions are the result of interactions among a large number of extremely simple-sometimes even binary-elements (cf. McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986) . Within the connectionist framework, models of attractor neural networks (cf. Hertz, Krogh, & Palmer, 1991; Hopfield, 1982) are especially relevant to the formal equivalence between mind and society. In this approach, the brain is modeled as a collection of densely interconnected neurons linked by synapses. Such systems are characterized by multiple feedback loops, in which each neuron influences and is influenced by numerous other neurons. In similar fashion, society can be characterized as a collection of individuals interconnected by social ties (cf. Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Moreno, 1953; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) . Each individual influences and is influenced by other individuals with whom he or she has social relations. Although connectionist models were developed to simulate brain function and mental processes, their underlying formalisms are proving useful in capturing social processes as well (e.g., Nowak, Vallacher, & Burnstein, 1998; Read & Miller, 1998) . Individuals are clearly different from neurons, of course, but the overall structure and functioning of both minds and societies are remarkably similar with respect to their formal properties. In both cases, global properties stem from the structure of connections among elements rather than from the nature of the elements themselves.
The human mind is unique in that it not only reflects the surrounding world, but also in that it reflects on its own operations and content. The reflexive nature of mind provides the basis for people's sense of self. The representation of self that results from this reflexivity mirrors the myriad thoughts and feelings experienced by mind and thus is a highly complex structure. At the same time, though, a sense of self would not emerge if the enormous range of self-relevant information was not characterized by at least some degree of coherence. To develop and maintain virtually any generalization about oneself, it is necessary to integrate at least some portion of the component information. To build an image of oneself as a good student, for example, one needs to integrate a wide set of pertinent facts and evaluations. The mind may well be a potential "tumbling ground for whimsies" (James, 1890 (James, /1950 , but there is a tendency for the separate elements of self to become linked to each other via multiple feedback loops and thereby achieve organization. In this process, congruent elements provide cross-validation for each other, whereas incongruent elements set in motion mechanisms designed to eliminate the incoherence or isolate the incongruent elements (e.g., Clary & Tesser, 1983; Hastie & Kumar, 1979) . In this way, the salience of low-level elements provides for the emergence of higher level structures (cf. Vallacher, 1993) .
The interdependency of self-relevant elements may be characterized as an associative network (e.g., Greenwald et al., in press) . In this view, specific thoughts about the self call to mind related thoughts, which become organized into progressively higher order assemblies that have emergent properties, such as self-evaluation and self-regulatory potential. Thoughts about a recent social interaction, for example, might bring to mind memories of other social encounters, and together these thoughts might generate an overall assessment of one's social skill and provide standards for how to behave in the future. Associative networks describe relations among the elements of self-structure in much the same way that social networks provide the means of describing relations among individuals. In both cases, mutual influences among the elements in question (i.e., thoughts and individuals) are responsible for the emergence of higher order properties and functions. Just as basic elements provide cross-validation in the self-structure, interacting individuals provide cross-validation for one another's perceptions, opinions, beliefs, and values. Social cross-validation is responsible for the emergence of coherence on a societal level and paves the way for the emergence of public opinions, group norms, and societal values.
Self-Integration
The self provides integration for other psychological structures. Self-schemas, for instance, influence what we notice about other people and how we organize our judgments of them (cf. Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985) . Although it is easy to appreciate how the self-system imposes organization on other structures, it is far from clear what imposes organization on the self-system. This question raises the specter of the homunculus (cf. Ryle, 1949; Vallacher, 1980) , an infinite regress of higher order structures in which each structure provides organization for the structure at the next lower level. Clearly, simply invoking yet higher levels of organization and control does little to solve the basic problem. One can always ask what organizes the highest level organizer.
The phenomenon of self-organization provides a solution to this long-standing philosophical problem. Numerous computer simulations, as well as analytical considerations, have established that global order in a system may emerge from local interactions among lower level elements, without any higher order supervisory mechanism (cf. Haken, 1982; Kelso, 1995; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Weisbuch, 1991) . The process of self-organization provides a way of thinking about the process of integration in self-concept Integration is not achieved through the control of a higher order structure, but rather is an emergent property deriving from the local interactions among the elements themselves. In this process, each element adopts a state that brings it into alignment with the states of other relevant elements.
It is important to note, however, that global integration is not the only fate of a complex system. In many diverse types of systems, only specific subsets of elements become integrated. This result occurs for two general reasons. First, there may be conflicting demands for integration. This is the case, for example, in most models of neural networks (cf. Hertz et al., 1991) . Because elements may experience conflicting signals from other elements, conforming to some elements may increase the incongruence with respect to others. Although the system as a whole cannot achieve global coherence, specific subsets of neurons may achieve coherence with respect to one another. This constraint on global integration is applicable to structure in the self-system. Some elements of the self, to begin with, may simply be incompatible. Friendliness and competitiveness, for example, may be equally positive characteristics for a person, but the expression of one may negate the expression of the other. Other elements of the self may be in conflict because of their social definition. When two people are antagonistic toward each other, for example, a person's friendliness toward one may be viewed as unfriendliness toward the other (cf. Heider, 1958) .
The second reason for partial as opposed to global integration is that the elements in a system sometimes can interact only with a limited number of neighboring elements. In cellular autorriata, for example, one often observes the emergence of local structures rather than unification (cf. Lewenstein, Nowak, & Latane, 1992; Nowak et al., 1990; Weisbuch, 1991; Wolfram, 1986) . In an initially disordered system, local interaction usually produces clusters of internally consistent elements. Depending on a variety of specific factors (e.g., individual differences among elements), these clusters may or may not become globally integrated (Lewenstein et al., 1992) . This constraint is also relevant to the fate of the integration process in the self-system. For such a large structure as the self, it is virtually impossible-not to mention unnecessary-to relate each element to all other elements. Particularly if one's behavior is effectively segregated by roles and social contexts, there may be no reason to consider a given pair of elements in relation to one another. One's competence at, say, spelling may never be considered with respect to one's effectiveness as a tennis player.
The notion that elements pertaining to the self may be segregated into separate evaluatively coherent areas is consistent with several lines of'theory and research in social psychology. There is considerable psychometric evidence, first of all, that the cognitive structures underlying social judgment tend to be multidimensional (e.g., Bieri et al., 1966; Kelly, 1963; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Scott, Osgood, & Peterson, 1979) . Viewing someone as intelligent, for example, does not necessarily bear on how one views his or her sociability (cf. Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972) . Researchers who have proposed functional accounts of social cognition and self-concept have reached similar conclusions regarding the multifaceted nature of underlying cognitive structures (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Gergen, 1971; Linville, 1985; Showers, 1995; Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989; Vallacher, 1980) . Role theorists, too, have recognized the functional necessity of segregating different aspects of the self into independent domains (cf. Biddle & Thomas, 1966; Sarbin & Allen, 1968) . From this perspective, to perform effectively in a given role may mean acting in ways that are inconsistent with the demands of other roles.
A person's degree of certainty regarding specific elements within well-integrated structures is considerably higher than his or her degree of certainty regarding the same elements in isolation. By itself, any given element is open to disconfirmation when exposed to external influences (e.g., social feedback or new information). If the element is well integrated with other elements, however, it receives supportive influence from these elements and thus can withstand challenges posed by incoming information. It may be easy to challenge someone's free-throw ability on the basis of a missed shot, for example, if free-throw ability is not well integrated into the person's sense of self as a basketball player. But if the person is well integrated in this respect, such challenges are likely to be ineffective, at least in the long run, as other relevant information allows the person to rebound from the challenge. In line with this reasoning, researchers have established that relatively global challenges to well-integrated structures (e.g., selfschematic personality traits) more often result in reactance than in acceptance, whereas challenges to isolated lower level elements (e.g., concrete instantiations of the trait) may well undermine the person's confidence in such elements (cf. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) . Even if incoming information causes an element in a well-integrated structure to change, the influence of the other elements in the structure is likely to restore its original value.
This account of integration tendencies and the development of structure in the self-system is analogous to the development of societal organization. In a similar way that different social groups are internally integrated but only loosely coordinated with one another most of the time, different subsets of low-level elements pertaining to the self become internally coherent but largely independent of each other. The stability afforded by differentiation is also similar in self-systems and societies. Thus, an isolated individual is highly vulnerable to the influence of external pressure and information, whereas the same individual in a supportive social network can withstand even intense social pressures to change.
Evaluative Coherence and Differentiation
There is reason to think that evaluative coherence provides the basis for integration in the self-system. Evaluation, after all, is arguably the most important global variable in the mental system , and evaluative consistency is widely recognized as providing the basis for organizing social judgments generally (cf. Abelson et al., 1968; Eiser, 1994; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Heider, 1944; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977) and self-concept in particular (cf. Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Showers, 1995; Tesser & Campbell, 1983) . The evaluative dimension can provide integration for low-level elements that may be quite disparate with respect to cognitive content and means-end relations Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994) . Donating money to charity and helping a child with homework are clearly distinct elements, for example, but are similar with respect to their reflection on one's sense of self as a socially responsible person. By the same token, cognitive elements that form a logically consistent structure may be vastly different in their evaluative implications. Being helpful to a stranger in need has a conflicting evaluative connotation with being helpful to a criminal. Because evaluative consistency provides the ultimate basis for integration, these two elements may be hard to reconcile with respect to one's sense of self. In short, although elements can be related to one another in many ways, the degree to which they are effectively integrated is often signaled by their evaluative consistency.
The press for integration on the basis of evaluative consistency can take many diverse forms. Well-documented mechanisms such as denial, discounting, selective recall, confirmatory bias, defensive attribution, and dissonance reduction all serve to maintain evaluative consistency in the face of potentially incongruent information. Consider, for example, an act of lying by someone who considers himself or herself to be a moral person. To maintain evaluative consistency in this aspect of his or her self-concept, the person may deny the act, discount the act as unimportant, forget the act over time, justify its occurrence in terms of a larger moral concern, or even change his or her view about the morality of lying. Although these mechanisms are clearly distinguishable and may occur under somewhat different circumstances, they all reflect an underlying concern with maintaining evaluative consistency in an important region of the self-system and may substitute for one another under certain conditions (cf. Tesser, Martin, & Cornell, 1996) .
As noted earlier, however, it is unlikely that the self-system can achieve global and complete integration. Instead, integration is likely to be achieved with respect to subsets of elements, with each subset corresponding to particular aspects of the self, such as roles, domain-specific self-images, self-schemas, and areas of personal competence or concern. Thus, a person might have a positive self-view with regard to, say, the domain of social skills but a far less flattering self-view with respect to the domain of mechanical skills. When each region of the self-system is internally consistent with respect to evaluation and the various regions differ in the value of this variable, the self-system as a whole can be described as evaluatively differentiated or compartmentalized (cf. Showers, 1995) . In a perfectly differentiated system, there is clear separation between those aspects of self that are viewed positively and those that are viewed negatively. In effect, the person knows in which realms he or she is good and in which realms he or she is bad.
Highly disordered (i.e., random) systems obviously lack evaluative differentiation, but so might systems that are highly differentiated in purely cognitive terms. It may well be possible, for example, to make subtle distinctions within a given substructure of the self, generating a mix of positively and negatively valenced elements concerning that aspect of the self. Although such sophisticated understanding might represent evidence of enhanced selfknowledge, it may provide conflicting information and thus be an ineffective guide to action with respect to that domain. Recognizing a multitude of both positive and negative consequences of an action in a given role, for example, may render a decision concerning the action virtually impossible. So although evaluative consistency in a region of the self-system may obscure specific distinctions in an informational sense, this very quality is what provides a basis for unequivocal action (cf. Jones & Gerard, 1967) . In this view, it is the press for integration that enables people to act in spite of their intrinsic capacity for seemingly unlimited cognition.
In sum, the press for integration is a causal force underlying the development of an evaluatively differentiated self-structure. The mutual influences among elements result in the integration of local areas of the self-system, where each area is internally coherent with respect to evaluation. A person may have a highly positive view of himself or herself as a parent, for example, but a far less flattering view of himself or herself with respect to athletic ability. In both cases, the person has an evaluatively coherent sense of self. The self-system is evaluatively integrated within specific domains, and as long as there is no press to integrate across domains, the system does not experience incongruencies.
There is reason to think that evaluative differentiation is highly adaptive, enabling a person to maintain a relatively stable, positive self-evaluation despite a high number of negative elements in his or her self-system. This is because the existence of well-defined positive and negative regions of the self-system makes it possible for the person to concentrate on the positive regions and to disregard the negative regions (e.g., Pelham & Swann, 1989; Showers & Kling, 1996) . This is true even if the negative regions contain highly salient negative elements. In a self-system that is not organized according to evaluation, in contrast, concentration on any single area of the system is likely to produce a self-evaluation that reflects the relative proportions (and relative salience) of positive and negative elements in the system as a whole. Effectively, then, an evaluatively differentiated self provides for selfcertainty, a sense of personal integration, and the possibility of maintaining positive self-evaluation despite the existence of salient negative elements in the serf-system.
Intrinsic Dynamics of Self-Organization
To examine generic features of self-integration and the emergence of collective properties of the self, we performed a series of computer simulations. These simulations were based on a cellular automata model designed to capture the process of integration due to local influences among basic elements. After describing the basic features of this model, we describe the results of simulations exploring important issues of selfdynamics and structure. First, we explore how an initially disorganized self-system might develop structure from its own intrinsic dynamics. Second, we investigate how the course of intrinsic dynamics in a disorganized system is affected by incoming information of varying intensity and valence. Finally, we examine the effects of incoming information on a selfsystem that has already developed structure and reached an equilibrium. Although intrinsic dynamics in this case have effectively ceased, incoming information may perturb the system's equilibrium and thus reinstate internally generated changes until a new equilibrium is reached.
Cellular Automata as a Model of Self-Organization
Models of cellular automata provide a formal platform for investigating properties of systems consisting of mutually interacting elements. Cellular automata are discrete dynamical systems composed of many simple elements. Each element may display two or more states. Time is also discrete, consisting of innumerable successive moments, r 15 f 2 ,..., ? n . The elements are arranged in a specific spatial configuration, often a two-dimensional lattice. The state of a given element at time t + 1 depends on the states of its neighboring elements at time t. The specific form of this dependence is expressed in updating rules. Different neighborhood structures are possible for the various spatial configurations used in cellular automata models. In a two-dimensional lattice, for instance, each element may have four neighbors (one on each side) or eight neighbors (the original four plus an additional four in the diagonals).
In research using cellular automata, one commonly observes the emergence of regularities and patterns on a global level that were not directly programmed into individual elements. These emergent properties often take the form of spatial patterns, with clusters of elements displaying the same state after a number of iterations of the updating rule. Emergent properties can also take the form of temporal patterns (cf. Wolfram, 1986) , including evolution toward a stable equilibrium (fixed-point attractor), alternation between different states (periodic attractor), and apparent randomness (chaotic attractor). Cellular automata are thus proving useful in investigating how different forms of local influence among elements (i.e., updating rales) promote the generation of global properties in a complex system. Several distinct and theoretically meaningful aspects of this linkage between local rules and collective properties have been identified in the context of group-and societal-level phenomena in recent years. These phenomena include the nature of social influence (e.g., Nowak et a!., 1990) , the emergence of cooperation (e.g., Messick & Liebrand, 1995) , and key features of political and economic transitions in society (e.g., Nowak, Lewenstein, & Szamrej, 1993; Nowak, Urbaniak, & Zienkowski, 1994) .
The society-of-self model shares some of the general features of the cellular automata model of social influence proposed by Nowak et al. (1990) . We assume that a self-system is composed of n elements, each reflecting a specific item of information relevant to the self. The elements are represented as cells arranged on a square grid with 20 cells on a side. The proximity of cells denotes their degree of relatedness and thus their potential for mutual influence. Because the focus here is on the generic features of the integration process, we assume that the elements correspond to the most rudimentary or low-level features of self-understanding. The integration of such elements results in the emergence of evaluatively consistent areas of the self-structure that serve as a basis for higher order features of the self (e.g., traits, areas of competence).
Each element is characterized with respect to its current evaluation. An element can be either positive, denoted by light gray, or negative, denoted by dark gray (see Figure 1 ). The assumption of bipolarity in evaluation is consistent with research showing that for personally important targets of judgment, the evaluation of target-relevant information tends to be dichotomous, with only extreme values (i.e., very good vs. very bad) represented phenomenologically (cf. Kelly, 1963) . The covariation between personal importance and evaluative extremity is apparent, for example, in the tendency for opinions on important issues to be distributed in a bimodal (i.e., U-shaped) fashion (Latan6 & Nowak, 1994) . The self is obviously a very important target of judgment (e.g., Greenwald et al., in press; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984) , so it is reasonable to assume that self-relevant information is evaluated in a binary (i.e., good vs. bad) manner. Because the elements are binary (i.e., either positive or negative), when they change they do so in an all-or-none rather than in an incremental manner.
The elements also differ in their respective weights, with some having greater centrality than others in a given area of the selfsystem. This means that some basic elements of self-understanding play a disproportionate role compared with other elements in shaping one's self-evaluation in a given area. Their centrality also means that they play a disproportionately strong role in validating the evaluation of other elements and that dieir valence is correspondingly difficult to change by virtue of influence from other elements. In thinking about one's social skill, for example, keeping people's attention validates the evaluation one has attached to telling jokes, maintaining eye contact, and the like. An element's centrality is represented by a number between 2 and 10, with higher numbers denoting greater centrality. An element's centrality is represented visually as its height in Figure 1 . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that an element's centrality does not change during the course of simulation. The self-system obviously consists of many areas, each of which has its set of central elements. For the sake of simplicity, we randomly positioned three maximally central elements (i.e., elements with a value of 10) in the grid and surrounded them with rings of elements with gradually decreasing centrality. The simulation grid can thus be understood as a self-structure composed of three different areas, each of them containing a highly central element and other elements varying in centrality in proportion to their distance from the central element.
To capture the nature of the integration process, we decided to start from the most extreme case, namely, a system that was totally disordered with respect to evaluation, and then observe the effect of imposed integrative mechanisms. 2 We assume that each element influences and is influenced by its eight neighboring elements (four on the adjacent sides and four on the connecting diagonals).
In the course of simulation, a randomly chosen element, i, adjusts to its neighboring cells by checking how much influence it receives from the positive as opposed to the negative elements. The basic idea here is that the element tends to adopt the valence most characteristic of its neighbors. In this process, each neighbor's centrality is taken into account, such that neighboring elements with greater centrality have greater influence on the element's valence. This involves weighting the valence, V, of each neighbor, j, by the neighbor's centrality, W (i.e., V, X W}). The resultant computation is the weighted sum of evaluations of the neighboring elements, 2(V,-X W,), reflecting a process similar to information integration (Anderson, 1981) . After the element's state is adjusted, another element is randomly chosen in a Monte Carlo fashion and the process is repeated. Because this procedure involves sampling with replacement, it is possible for a particular element to be chosen more than once in a single simulation step and for other elements not to be chosen in that step. Each so-called Monte Carlo step in the simulation corresponds to 400 (20 X 20) samplings, so that on average each element is likely to be chosen once. This process is repeated until the state of the system reaches an asymptote, reflecting either no further change in the states of elements or a stable pattern of changes in the system. Three global measures are derived in this model:
1. Self-evaluation is the weighted average of all the elements in the structure (cf. Anderson, 1981) , with the weight of each element corresponding to its centrality. It is computed according to the following formula:
the proportion of neighbors sharing a common valence (as compared with the total number of possible links among neighbors).
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It is computed according to the following formula:
where V, is the valence for element i, with 1 denoting positively and -1 denoting negativity, and W, is the weight (centrality) of element i. This index can range from -1 to 1, with a value of 0 corresponding to a balance between the weighted average of positive and negative elements.
2. Evaluative differentiation reflects the degree to which the elements form clusters of similar valence. This measure reflects where C ohs is the number of existing links between neighboring elements of the same valence, C chance is the number of links between neighboring elements of the same valence expected in a randomly ordered system, and C max is the maximum number of links between neighboring elements of the same valence that is possible in a system in which positive and negative elements form two compact clusters. A random arrangement of elements has a value of 0, and the perfect separation of elements into two compact clusters has a value of 1. Intermediate values reflect corresponding degrees of spatial order. Note that C obs is based on observation, whereas C ch£mc( . and C max are derived theoretically, and their values depend on the number of positive and negative elements and on the geometry of the matrix (see Latane, Nowak, & Liu, 1994) .
In a maximally clustered system, all the elements (except those on the border of a cluster) are surrounded by other elements of the same valence. In a system lacking evaluative differentiation, on the other hand, the probability of two neighboring elements having the same valence is dictated only by the overall proportions of positive and negative elements.
3. Self-dynamism reflects the proportion of elements that change their state in a given simulation step. At each simulation step, it is computed according to the following formula:
where k is the number of elements that change their value and n is the total number of elements (i.e., 400). The value of this measure varies between 0, reflecting no change, and 1, reflecting a change in all the sampled elements. When tracked over time, this measure characterizes the volatility of the system's temporal evolution. The value of this measure at the last simulation step (i.e., after the system has reached an asymptote), then, specifies whether the -»-Self-Evaluation -*-Dynamism self-system has reached a static equilibrium or instead can be characterized in terms of a dynamic equilibrium with a specific value of volatility.
The Process of Self-Organization Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics typically observed in the process of self-organization. In the starting configuration, the arrangement of positive and negative elements is random, corresponding to a self that lacks structure (i.e., evaluative differentiation). To capture the positivity bias in self-evaluation (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988) , however, we assume that 60% of the elements are positive and 40% are negative. 5 Because centrality is assigned randomly to positive and negative elements, the initial 60%-40% distribution corresponds to weighted average values that vary around a mean of .2 rather than 0. valence, however, it is likely to change its state to conform to these elements, although if it is highly central it may resist the summed influence of its neighboring elements. 6 As a result of this process, elements of similar valence tend to cluster and produce evaluatively coherent regions.
In addition to the emergence of structure, the positivity bias also becomes more strongly pronounced over the course of simulations, changing from the initial value of .2 to an asymptotic value of .64.
This increase reflects the fact that more elements change from 5 The positivity bias can also be represented by assuming that elements of positive valence have greater weight (i.e., centrality) than negative elements. Both analytical considerations (Lewenstein et al., 1992) and computer simulations have established that similar effects are observed whether bias is created through unequal numbers of elements or through the unequal weighting of an equal number of elements. 6 Note that elements on the borders of the matrix are surrounded by five rather than eight elements, and those in the corners are surrounded by only three elements. This gives clusters of negative elements in these positions a slight survival advantage because their relative isolation protects them against influence from conflicting elements.
negative to positive states than vice versa. In a disordered system, the proportion of both positive and negative elements in any given area corresponds roughly to the proportion of positive and negative elements in the system as a whole. A given element is thus more likely to be surrounded by positive than by negative elements and is thus likely to experience a pull in a positive direction. In a clustered system, however, most elements are surrounded by elements of the same valence, so that only the elements on the borders of the clusters are subjected to conflicting influence. The emergence of evaluative differentiation thus stabilizes the self-structure.
Although there is an increase in the proportion of positive elements, the negative elements that manage to survive tend to be highly central and thus resistant to further change. In effect, as the self grows in positivity, the mean weight of negative elements increases as less central negative elements are eliminated. This result is consistent with research showing that although positive information is more prevalent than negative information in cognitive structures, negative information tends to be more salient than positive information (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Coovert & Reeder, 1990; Kanouse & Hanson, 1971; Peelers & Czapinski, 1990; Pratto & John, 1991; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 1991; . This conclusion regarding the average strength of minority elements has also been reached through analytical considerations (Lewenstein et al., 1992) .
The intrinsic dynamics observed in these initial simulations are due to mutual influences among elements in the model. Such influences presuppose a press for integration; lacking such a press, there would be no intrinsic dynamics and thus no self-organization. The strength of this press, however, can clearly vary in accord with contextual and personal variables (e.g., Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995) . In some situations, for example, people are more likely to feel self-aware and concerned with issues of consistency (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Wicklund & Prey, 1980) . Conditions that make salient the transmission rather than the receipt of information also tend to promote a greater concern with information integration (cf. Zajonc, 1960) . It is also the case that people may momentarily lack the cognitive resources necessary to achieve integration of diverse elements. This may happen, for example, when people are under stress or experience cognitive overload (cf. Bargh, 1997; Gilbert, 1993) . Achieving integration presumably requires cognitive resources (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) , so anything that diverts such resources to other cognitive tasks can promote a corresponding weakening of integration tendencies. Even under conditions that promote self-awareness (e.g., the presence of an audience) or a concern with transmitting information, the demands in that context (e.g., performing a difficult or stressful task) may effectively exhaust the cognitive resources that might otherwise be used to achieve integration.
To capture this type of variation, we ensured that subsequent simulations systematically varied the strength of influence among elements. This was done by multiplying the computed influence on each element by a value, P, that is constant for a given round of simulations. The higher this value, the greater the weight attached to the summary evaluation associated with the other elements. The influence from neighboring elements on a given element, then, can be expressed as P X 2(V,-X Wj), where P equals the value of press for integration. This variable corresponds to a person's concern with evaluative consistency. In the simulations, a value of I represented high press for integration and a value of . 1 represented low press for integration. 7 We chose relatively extreme values of P to ensure that qualitatively different behaviors of the system were captured. The high value (P = 1) means that the state of neighboring elements has the same influence as the element has on itself, whereas the low value (P = .1) means that each of the neighboring elements has only 10% of the influence that the element has on itself. Because there are eight neighboring elements, low press for integration means that their combined effect cannot exceed the influence of the element on itself unless one (or more) of the neighboring elements is considerably more central (i.e., has greater weight) than the element itself.
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Intrinsic Dynamics and Incoming Information
The self does not develop in a vacuum. To the contrary, self-understanding depends to a large degree on the nature and quantity of experiences in everyday situations. Were it not for such experiences, there would be no elements of the self to become organized. The sources of self-relevant information are diverse, reflecting such processes as social feedback, social comparison, self-perception of one's actions, perceptions of success versus failure, and so forth. Obviously, then, the intrinsic dynamics of the integration processes that assemble the self are rarely left untouched by external influences. To model the effects of these influences on the emergence of collective properties in the self-system, we started with an initially disorganized system, similar to the initial configurations used in the simulations reported above, and varied the intensity and valence of incoming information.
In the first set of simulations, positively and negatively valenced information entered the system with equal probability. Note that this means that incoming information was less positive on average than the initial state of the self-structure (i.e., 60% positive elements). Operationally, we treated incoming information as a random variable from a normal distribution with a mean of 0, signifying neutral evaluation, but with one of four standard deviations (0, 1, 3, and 6). So although the incoming information was neutral (M = 0) when averaged over time, the valence of the information varied around this mean with different degrees of magnitude corresponding to the different standard deviations. For example, a standard deviation of 1, signifying low intensity, meant that 95% of the time the valence of the information was between -1.96 and 1.96, whereas a standard deviation of 6, signifying the highest intensity, meant that 95% of the time the valence of the information was between -11.76 and 11.76. By way of comparison, the influence of an element on itself ranged between 2 (low centrality) and 10 (high centrality).
7 Strong versus weak press for integration can be visualized as small versus large distance between adjacent elements. This equivalence between spacing of elements and influence reflects the assumption that influence decays with distance (cf. Nowak et al., 1990 ). The information was introduced into the system by adding a random number, R, to the weighted sum of internal influences on each element. The value of J? changed randomly (within a given range of intensity), bolh across elements and simulation steps, so that the same element might experience a positive influence at one simulation step but a negative influence at the next step. Because of its random nature, information may be considered noise entering the system. In addition to varying the intensity of information, we varied the press for integration, P, at two levels, with a value of 1 representing high press and .1 representing low press for integration. The total influence each element received at each simulation step was thus P x £(V, x Wj) + R.
The simulations were run for 50 Monte Carlo steps, so that each element had on average 50 opportunities to adjust its state to that of the other elements. The measures of self-evaluation, evaluative differentiation, and self-dynamism were obtained after the final (i.e., 50th) simulation step. The results, averaged across 1(K) simulations, arc displayed in Figures 3, 4 , and 5. In the absence of noise (i.e., M and SD = 0), the system stabilized within the first 10 steps, whereas in the presence of noise, stabilization was not observed even after the 50 steps. Overall, however, the incoming information had much less effect under conditions of high press for integration than under conditions of low press for integration. This result is directly reflected in self-dynamism. With high press for integration, only a very small proportion of elements (.03) changed Iheir state, even under conditions of high information intensity. Self-evaluation and evaluative differentiation also were largely unaffected by the intensity of incoming information when there was a high press for integration. These results suggest that having sufficient cognitive resources available enables people to actively resist incoming information lhat might otherwise undermine their existing sense of self.
Wilh weak press for integration, in contrast, incoming information had a marked effect on all three variables. When the influence from neighboring clemenls is too weak to change an element, intrinsic dynamics in the self-system are at a minimum. This makes the system highly reactive to any incoming information. In effect, such information shakes up the system. Under low values of intensity, though, the incoming information is insufficient to independently dictate the value of elements. Rather, the relatively few elements that change their state in a given simulation step almost always do so in the direction of influence from other elements. Such enhancement uf the system's intrinsic dynamics has the effect of increasing the degree of differentiation and positivity bias in the system. This scenario corresponds to a situation where external information is assimilated into a system only if it agrees with many 
Intensity
Figure 3. Self-dynamism by press for integration and intensity of incoming information.
I Low Press I High Press
Intensity Figure 4 . Self-evaluation by press for integration and intensity of incoming information.
• Low Press • High Press Figure 5 . Evaluative differentiation by press for integration and intensity of incoming information.
of the system's elements and thus increases the coherence of the system.
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In this model of self-structure, then, incoming information of a random structure has a paradoxical effect, increasing rather than decreasing the organization among elements, provided such information is not sufficiently intense to overpower the system. It follows from the model that a person with a low press for integration may benefit from social feedback and other sources of self-relevant information, as long as such information does not convey highly conflicting evaluations. Such information has a way of facilitating the person's self-integration, even if its evaluative structure is essentially random and less positive than the person's existing sense of self. This suggests that people may turn to others, not to learn specific things about themselves, but to facilitate their own internal process of achieving coherence in their self-concept.
This situation reverses dramatically with higher values of information intensity. In effect, the shaking becomes sufficiently strong that it dictates the dynamics of the system rather than facilitating the system's intrinsic dynamics. Extrapolating from these results, under weak press for integration, a person's existing sense of self is insufficient to provide a basis for rejecting incoming information. This makes the person vulnerable to evaluatively intense social feedback and other sources of self-relevant ideas. Because the structure of incoming information is random and because system elements change their state independently of their neighborhood context, higher order differentiated structures begin to decompose (or cannot be formed in the first place). The system loses intrinsic dynamics and simply follows outside influences. And because these influences are less positive than the initial state of the system, the positivity bias in self-evaluation also diminishes. In short, when the system lacks the cognitive resources to check for possible inconsistencies and conflicts among elements, it becomes vulnerable to new information from outside sources. Without the capacity for rejecting incoming information, even patently absurd ideas may be initially incorporated into the system without much of a fight (cf. Gilbert, 1993) .
Intrinsic Dynamics and Biased Incoming Information
In the simulations described thus far, incoming information was equally balanced between positive and negative valence. Clearly, information relevant to the self is rarely balanced like this in real-world settings. Feedback from other people, for example, is commonly slanted toward favorable or unfavorable judgments, with positively biased information being more common than negatively biased appraisals (e.g., Tesser & Rosen, 1975) . To explore evaluative biases, we ran further simulations in which a constant positive or negative value was added to incoming information. To represent negative bias, we changed the mean of incoming information from 0 to -2; to represent positive bias, the mean was changed to 2. The absence of information, meanwhile, was represented by a value of 0. We ran two sets of simulations to explore the effect of bias. The first investigated the effects of hias on the development of the self-system as a function of low versus high press for integration. The second investigated how a self-system that has already formed (i.e., a self that is positive, differentiated, and high in integration press) reacts to biased incoming information. In both cases, the simulations were run for 50 steps. Results for each condition represent the average across 100 simulations.
Consider first the results for the effect of incoming information on the formation of the self-system. In general, the results are consistent with the results of the simulations investigating the effects of random information (described earlier). Under conditions of high press for integration, the self-system was able to resist incoming information, regardless of its valence. Under low press for integration, in contrast, the self-system was strongly affected by incoming information. This effect is apparent with respect to change versus stability in self-evaluation (see Figure 6) . Under low press, negative incoming information was able to reverse the positivity bias and promote negative self-evaluation. Biased information was also similar to random information in its effect on evaluative differentiation (see Figure 7) . Under high press for integration, information of either valence had little effect on the degree of clustering, although positive information tended to promote slightly greater clustering than did negative information. Under low press for integration, incoming information of either valence tended to increase differentiation in the self-system, a result that again replicates the findings regarding the impact of noise.
Consider now the effect of biased information on a self-system that has already formed. This set of simulations investigated how the self-system reestablishes equilibrium after exposure to positive versus negative incoming information. They differed in two basic ways from the previous simulations. First, the starting configuration reflected the typical final configuration of the initial simulations (i.e., after 50 steps). Thus, the starting self-system was at static equilibrium, with a strong positivity bias, a high degree of differentiation, and no dynamism. Second, the valenced information was presented only at the outset instead of being supplied throughout the simulation steps. The information was introduced by reversing the valence of 15% of either the positive or the negative elements (randomly chosen in both cases). The system was then allowed to run without the introduction of any further information. The simulations in all cases were conducted under high press for integration.
The results of these simulations for self-evaluation and evaluative differentiation are presented in Figures 8 and 9 , respectively. Each graph portrays the changes in these measures, with Time 1 depicting the equilibrium of the system before the receipt of information, Time 2 depicting the state of the system immediately after the information was introduced, and the three succeeding 9 To understand this mechanism, consider a noncentral negative element surrounded by eight positive elements with low centrality. The total influence of all eight elements is equal to 1.6 (eight elements, each with a centrality value of 2 and a press value of .1). This value is not sufficient to override the influence of an element on itself (which equals 2). When the incoming information acts in the same direction as the influence of elements within the system, even low values of incoming information can change an element's valence, [f, on the other hand, the same configuration of elements is evaluatively consistent, the value of incoming information necessary to change an element's valence is 3.6, because an element's influence on itself (2) is in the same direction of the influence from its eight neighboring elements (1.6). Because intensity was normally distributed, a value of 3.6 or greater occurred with considerably less frequency than values exceeding .4. Changes in the direction of greater evaluative consistency were thus much more frequent in the presence of noise than were changes in the direction of lower consistency. . Self-evaluation in a disordered system by press for integration and biased incoming information.
I Low Press I High Press
Evaluative Bias Figure 7 . Evaluative differentiation in a disordered system by press for integration and biased incoming information.
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Time
Figure 8. Self-evaluation by biased incoming information for a stable system with high press for integration.
times depicting successive simulation steps. Time 6 portrays the final equilibrium of the system, which was typically achieved before 10 simulation steps. For self-evaluation, negative information had a temporary effect, serving to decrease the proportion of positive elements at Time 2. After three simulation steps, however, self-evaluation was restored to almost its original value (.6). Positive information also produced an initial effect, serving to increase self-evaluation, although this effect was much less pronounced than the corresponding effect of negative information. Because of the positivity bias, fewer negative elements were available to be reversed. The increment in self-evaluation in response to positively biased information diminished less than the corresponding decrement produced by negative information. The results for evaluative differentiation also revealed some asymmetry between positively and negatively biased incoming information. Negative information served to disorganize an already organized system to a higher degree man did information biased toward positivity. This effect is due to the fact that 15% of positive elements represents a higher number than 15% of negative elements. In both conditions, however, the system's structure became fully reestablished after several simulation steps.
Taken together, these results suggest that the self-system is quite immune to information that contradicts its current state. Self-systems characterized by positive self-evaluation seem to be especially immune to negative information. There is an immediate effect of such information, but because of the ongoing integration process, the self fairly quickly regains its preexisting equilibrium. In view of the previous simulation results, however, it is clear that the effects of incoming information depend not only on self-evaluation, but also on the structural and dynamic properties that shape the process of integration and assimilation of information.
Temporal Structure of Conflicting Information
The results of the simulations thus far suggest that an integrated self-system is remarkably immune to the effects of incoming information of negative valence. Even if such information temporarily disrupts the evaluative organization of the system and reduces positivity, the integrative mechanisms can restore the organization and overall valence of the system. This finding corresponds to empirical work by Showers and her colleagues (e.g., Showers & Kling, 1996) ; they demonstrated that compartmentalization in the self-structure breaks the link between negative information and negative self-evaluation. This effect is said to reflect the concentration of negative information in nonsalient areas of the self-structure. The results of our simulations suggest an additional mechanism by which compartmentalization may shield the self from negative infor-0.1 I Negative I Positive Figure 9 . Evaluative differentiation by biased incoming information for a stable system with high press for integration. mation. As long as contradictory information is sufficiently spaced in time, even repetitive sets of such information are unlikely to destabilize the existing structure because each set arrives at a system that has effectively nullified the effects of earlier sets. This temporal spacing of incoming information helps explain how people can maintain positive self-evaluation in the face of seemingly overwhelming negative feedback and traumatic life events (cf. Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998) .
Although the self-system is clearly capable of reintegration when faced with contradictory information, this effect does not occur instantly but rather unfolds in real time. If the self-system does not have sufficient time to reintegrate before the arrival of further contradictory information, there may be an appreciable toll on the organization and positivity of the system. To explore this possibility, we began with a well-differentiated and positive selfstructure and exposed it to incoming information of contradictory (i.e., negative) valence. The negative information was introduced by reversing the valence of 60% of the positive elements. The amount of the incoming information was constant, but we varied the rate at which it was introduced into the system. The negative information was spread over 6 simulation steps (lowest temporal concentration), 3 steps, or 2 steps, or it was all presented in the first simulation step (highest temporal concentration). In a control condition, no negative information was presented. The simulations in each case were run for 30 steps after the first instance of incoming information, and self-evaluation was assessed at the 30th simulation step.
Results showed that in all cases, self-dynamism was 0 at the 30th step, indicating that the process of integration had completed. As expected, the temporal concentration of negative information affected self-evaluation (see Figure 10) . The faster the information entered the system, the lower the positivity of the system. Even when all the negative information entered the system in two steps, however, self-evaluation remained positive. Only when the negative information was presented all at once (highest temporal concentration) did self-evaluation become negative. The highly concentrated information was able to change the self-structure because the mutual support provided by a large number of negative elements in a short time was able to counteract the influence of positive elements in the system. This effect suggests that although people often appear immune to inconsistent feedback (cf. Baumeister, 1993; Swarm, 1990) , such feedback might promote change if it were concentrated in time and effectively changed elements at a rate that exceeded the rate of self-integration processes. People with low selfesteem might be especially inclined to change in this manner, in view of the connection between low self-esteem and indexes of Temporal Spacing of Information Figure 10 . Self-evaluation by temporal concentration of inconsistent information.
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Step uncertainty and poor differentiation (e.g., Baumgardner, 1990 : Campbell et al., 1996 Kernis, 1993; Vallacher, 1978) .
The Self-System in Perspective
There is widespread agreement that the self is multifaceted, consisting of many diverse cognitive and affective elements. There is also consensus that the self is a unitary concept, open to description with global notions such as self-esteem and selfcertainty. At first blush, these two perspectives on the self seem irreconcilable. A primary theme of this article is that the "one versus many" issue can be resolved by assuming that the self is defined in terms of the organization among basic elements and the emergent properties to which this organization gives rise. The global properties of the self-system, then, cannot be reduced to the sum or average of the values associated with the starting configuration of basic elements. Rather, the properties that characterize the system as a whole reflect the interactions among the system's elements. In principle, very different self-concepts, each characterized by unique values of global variables (e.g., self-esteem), can be built from the same set of self-relevant thoughts, memories, and feelings.
The model we have presented here provides a framework within which certain organizational tendencies in the self-system can be depicted and investigated. As a means of highlighting the basic features of this model and its primary implications for self-theory, we consider the results of the simulations in light of three longstanding issues in theoretical accounts of the self: the interplay of internal and external factors in shaping self-concept, the nature of stability and change in self-concept, and the bases for coherence in self-concept. We conclude by noting the limitations of the model in its present form and by suggesting avenues for future research within this paradigm.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Dynamics
To an appreciable extent, the dynamics of self-organization are internally generated, produced by mutual influences among the lower level elements of self-understanding. This means that in the absence of incoming information, the self-system displays change as the system elements attempt to align themselves with respect to evaluation. Because of the sheer size of the self-system and the enormous diversity of self-relevant thoughts and memories, this process of progressive integration is unlikely to result in global coherence. Instead, the elements are likely to become organized into a number of coherent subsets that are relatively independent of each other. This is not to suggest that external information has no influence on the self-system. To the contrary, incoming information plays a critical role in the formation of self-structure and continues to play a role in systems that have achieved organization. The specific effect of incoming information, however, depends on its interaction with the existing organization of the self-system. In a relatively unorganized system, random information (i.e., information without a consistent valence) can increase or decrease selforganization tendencies, depending on the extremity of this information. Nonextreme incoming information tends to increase organization, facilitating the emergence of structure in a system that otherwise would not be able to cohere into subsets of elements. Extreme random information, on the other hand, can exceed the capacity of the integrative mechanisms in the serf-system and thus disrupt the emergence of coherent subsets of elements. This effect is more readily pronounced under conditions associated with low press for integration. In essence, the system begins to follow the structure of the incoming information, so that the dynamics of the system become extrinsic rather than intrinsic.
Extrapolating from these considerations, it may be that the appetite for self-relevant information from others is driven in part by the need to achieve and maintain organization in the selfsystem. In this view, even random external information is desired when people are uncertain about themselves, because incoming information helps to organize existing elements. Social feedback and other interpersonal sources of self-relevant information may have little in the way of coherent content, but such input may serve to shake up the self-system and in this way facilitate the process of mutual influence among elements in the system. This principle may in fact be relevant to mental systems generally. The research on sensory deprivation (e.g., Zubek, 1969) , for example, has shown that in the absence of external information, thoughts become progressively disorganized, even bizarre. When deprived in this manner, people become desperate for any outside stimulation, perhaps because such information provides a means by which internally generated thoughts and sensations can become organized. In a related vein, Arnit (1989) has argued that the brain cannot function effectively without noise. Presumably, noise interacts with the existing structure of synaptic connections to produce meaningful dynamics (i.e., dynamics that convey information). In light of this work, it is reasonable to suggest that the self needs incoming information to achieve and maintain coherence. The results of the simulations suggest that the strength of this need is enhanced when the self-system lacks sufficient structure to organize the wealth of information it contains.
This perspective on the role of incoming information in selfconcept dynamics and structure provides a new way to think about affiliation motives. In this view, people may seek out others not so much for the specific insights these people have to offer but rather for the priming of self-organization tendencies their comments are likely to generate. It is noteworthy in this regard that affiliation tendencies are enhanced when people are uncertain about their thoughts, feelings, competencies, and other aspects of their personal state (cf. Festinger, 1954; Schachter, 1959; Trope, 1986) . The specific information gleaned from such contact may not be particularly memorable, let alone inspiring, but it may provide a basis for sorting out and organizing the myriad diverse thoughts and feelings experienced by the person when he or she is uncertain. Even negative feedback from others may be embraced when people are uncertain about a particular aspect of the self, because such feedback provides a basis for achieving coherence and stability in self-concept (cf. Vallacher, 1980) . At the same time, though, the very same people are most likely to be hurt by incoming information if it exceeds a certain threshold of intensity. If we extrapolate from the simulation results, we see that information that is widely divergent in valence can overwhelm the integrative capacity of a weakly organized self-system and disrupt whatever degree of organization exists.
By the same token, when people have a relatively coherent perspective on themselves in a given context, their need for incoming information is correspondingly diminished. Indeed, even coherent (as opposed to random) feedback may have little impact on people with a currently well-structured sense of self, because the mutual influences among organized elements insulate them against change. In such instances, only feedback that is consistent with the global valence of the self-domain in question is likely to be assimilated (cf. Swann & Ely, 1984) .
Stability and Change in the Self-System
Most theoretical accounts of the self emphasize the importance of maintaining stability in one's overall sense of serf and in one's more specific self-images (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1996; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997; Swann, 1990; Tesser, 1988) . The self provides an important frame of reference for thought and action, so it is entirely reasonable that it should be invested with a fair degree of stability in the face of contradictory information, setbacks, and other challenges posed by. the social and physical environment. The results of the simulations confirm the tendency toward stability in global properties of the self, but they also point to two rather different manifestations of this tendency. In a self characterized by static equilibrium, there is resistance to incoming information that would change the status of an element or a subset of elements. In a self-concept characterized by dynamic equilibrium, there may be assimilation of inconsistent information in the short term but a tendency for elements and subsets of elements to return to their original value on a longer time scale. Research on the stability issue has typically centered on people's immediate reaction to influence (e.g., social or performance feedback) and thus is relevant to static equilibrium. However, there is reason to suspect that dynamic equilibrium is also a pervasive feature of the self-system and hence warrants investigation in its own right.
Consider first the case of static equilibrium. This tendency is likely to be observed in a self-system that is relatively unintegrated but consists of relatively strong individual elements. When this is the case, the person's sense of self is tied up in the content of specific self-assessments. In the face of evidence contradicting these assessments, the person may actively resist change and thus demonstrate impressive stability in his or her self-image. At some point, however, the magnitude and weight of incoming contradictory information may become overwhelming and promote a dramatic change in the person's self-image. Assuming the elements maintain their degree of strength (i.e., centrality), once such a change occurs the original self-image is unlikely to be restored. Dynamic equilibrium follows a quite different scenario. This tendency is likely to be observed in a serf-system that is relatively integrated, consisting of clusters of elements that provide mutual support for one another. The individual elements may be relatively weak, so that the person's sense of self is not tied to any one particular consideration. When such a consideration is challenged, then, the incoming information may be temporarily accepted and compared with other elements in that self-domain. Because the information conflicts with many other elements and because these elements provide support for the original element, the incongruent information will ultimately be rejected. In this scenario, then, incoming incongruent information engages integration mechanisms, temporarily producing volatile dynamics in the system. After some time, however, the original self-image (as well as corresponding self-evaluation) is restored.
It is interesting to map these two forms of self-concept stability onto individual differences with respect to dimensions such as ego control (e.g., Loevinger, 1997) and open-versus closedmindedness (e.g., Rokeach, 1968) . People with an unintegrated sense of self (i.e., a weak ego) have their self-worth tied up in specific aspects of themselves (e.g., Crocker & Wolfe, 1998) , and the centrality of those aspects to self-esteem can make their selfconcepts very resistant to change. Rather than considering incongruenl evidence, such information is rejected outright in a rigid and closed-minded manner. A person's self-worth, for example, may be highly linked to specific athletic talents or indications of wealth. If those attributes are undermined, the person's entire sense of self may be threatened. If, on the other hand, a person's sense of self is built on a broad combination of specific virtues and talents, each element contributes relatively less to the person's self-evaluation and can be compensated for by other elements that have not been changed (cf. Linville, 1985; Vallacher, 1980) . And because of the supportive influence of other elements with which it is locally integrated, there is potential for restoration of an element that has changed in response to incongruent information.
It is conceivable, of course, that a well-integrated system might consist of strong rather than weak elements. Such a system should show the greatest resistance to change, combining the features of both static and dynamic equilibrium. Not only does integration with other elements provide potential for each element to bounce back after it has changed, but the strength of these elements also makes it more difficult to change in the first place. By the same token, it is conceivable that a self-system might be characterized by both lack of integration and uniformly weak elements. Such a system would demonstrate neither static nor dynamic equilibrium and would effectively be at the mercy of incoming information. A self-concept reflecting these dynamical and structural features would be insufficient to provide the frame of reference for judgment and action that is commonly assumed in theoretical accounts of the self.
The distinction between static and dynamic equilibrium underscores the importance of time scales when attempting to understand the dynamics of the self-system (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998a) . When a self-image is disturbed by moderately strong influence, in the long run the effect of the disturbance will be negligible regardless of which type of equilibrium characterizes the system. In the short run, however, the person with dynamic resistance may show a strong effect with a rebound occurring at some later time, whereas the person widi static resistance will show negligible effects in the short run as well. Although it may be difficult to distinguish the two types of resistance under moderate disturbance in the long run, the types will show qualitatively different dynamics once change has occurred. Whereas a dynamically stable self-system will restore its original state, a self-system characterized by static equilibrium may lack this restorative capacity because of the weakness of its integrative potential.
Even in a system characterized by dynamic equilibrium, it is possible for incoming information to undermine the system's structure and produce long-term qualitative changes in global properties of the system. A key factor here is the temporal spacing of incongruent information. If the time lag between elements of negative information is sufficiently long, the self-system will have time to reestablish equilibrium after each element is changed, so that the information will have negligible long-term effect. On the other hand, if all the incongruent elements are presented at the same time, they may push the system to a new equilibrium, making it difficult for (he self-system to return to its initial state. From another perspective, if a single conflicting element enters an already organized domain, it is easily rejected by the combined influence of the other elements in the domain. But if several conflicting elements arrive at the same time, they can provide mutual support for each other and hence organize into a cluster, and such a cluster can counteract the mutual influences among elements in the domain in question.
Coherence in Self-Concept
The notion of self-concept coherence assumes the operation of integrative mechanisms in the self-system. This is a highly reasonable assumption in light of many independent lines of theory and research that invoke motives toward cognitive and evaluative consistency in psychological systems (cf. Abelson et al., 1968; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; lesser, 1978) . Results from the work on thought-induced attitude polarization (Tesser, 1978) , for instance, have demonstrated that when people think about something (i.e., an object, activity, or person) that has personal importance, there is a tendency for the initial evaluation to become progressively extreme during the course of judgment. Presumably, thoughts that are consistent with the initial evaluation reinforce one another, whereas inconsistent cognitive and affective elements are suppressed or reinterpreted to bring them into line with the prevailing sentiment. Integrative mechanisms of this kind are posited in the present model. Thus, elements of the self are put into juxtaposition and checked for possible inconsistencies. When incongruities are detected, the system actively rejects or reinterprets the element in question so as to achieve or maintain internal coherence. The detection of incoherence may focus integration mechanisms on the relevant aspects of the self, and the amount of cognitive resources devoted to this task may increase until integration is achieved, unless a parallel task drains cognitive resources (cf. Gilbert, 1993) , or the attempt becomes sufficiently hopeless or aversive that it promotes disengagement (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1990) .
Because of the complexity and sheer size of the self-system, complete evaluative integration is unlikely to be attained. The lack of global integration is not problematic for people as long as they can achieve local integration with respect to subsets of elements in their self-system. In fact, there is evidence that having a differentiated self-concept facilitates adaptive functioning. Linville (1985) , for instance, has found that highly differentiated people better accommodate failures, setbacks, and other sources of negative information pertaining to the self. Research on self-schemas (Markus, 1980) , in turn, has shown that having a well-defined knowledge structure in a given domain enables the person to respond quickly and decisively to information of a self-relevant nature. These benefits, however, are likely to be manifest only when the elements within regions of the self are evaluatively coherent (e.g., Showers & Kling, 1996) . Cognitive differentiation (e.g., Linville, 1985) provides a basis for rich understanding of information pertaining to the self, but if this understanding is evaluatively inconsistent it may provide weak and conflicting guides for action. Evaluative coherence within a region of the self-system, on the other hand, may represent insensitivity to subtle distinctions, but this integrative tendency allows for ready interpretation of incoming information and a ready basis for the planning and conduct of action.
The degree of coherence observed in a self-system clearly depends on the strength of the press for integration. There is reason to think that the importance of integrative mechanisms rise and fall in accord with meaningful and specifiable factors. Particularly relevant in this regard is self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) , which focuses explicitly on variation in people's conscious concern with achieving and maintaining self-consistency. According to this theory, a person in a self-aware state is motivated to maintain consistency with respect to whatever aspect of the self is currently salient for him or her. Incoming information that is incongruent with the salient self-domain becomes a source of discomfort, leading to compensatory thought and behavior to restore consistency to the system. Incongruent social feedback, for instance, might be rejected after considering it in light of wellstructured (and hence well-protected) clusters of relevant thoughts and feelings. Such concerns are said to be lacking when a person is not in a state of self-focused attention. Instead, the non-selfaware person is said to be responsive to rewards, costs, and other factors in the immediate context, with little regard for the implications of his or her behavior for self-concept coherence (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981) .
Variability in the press for integration also follows from theory and research on cognitive busyness (Gilbert, 1993) , if one makes the reasonable assumption that mental resources are required to engage in the integrative processes depicted in the present model. Presumably, any factor that drains cognitive resources (e.g., distraction, a parallel task) can both inhibit the comparison of elements with respect to mutual consistency and weaken the mutual influences among elements that would establish coherence. In this light, it is interesting to consider research showing that when people are put under cognitive load, they demonstrate an enhanced tendency to incorporate information that is inconsistent with their prevailing self-concept (e.g., Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990) . Thus, although people with low self-esteem tend to reject positive information by virtue of its inconsistency with global properties of their self-system, they tend to readily embrace such information when they are induced to be cognitively busy (e.g., Paulhus & Levitt, 1987) . Presumably, the drain on mental resources is tantamount to weakening the press for integration that would otherwise protect them against the incongruent (but flattering) self-relevant information.
We hasten to add that the correspondence between the press for integration as developed in the present model and relevant variables established in experimental work is necessarily speculative at this point. Future researchers must develop precise means of assessing variation in the press for integration and determine whether such variation maps onto established phenomena such as self-awareness and cognitive busyness. Researchers must also investigate whether and to what extent the press for integration plays a theoretically meaningful role in people's reaction to selfrelevant information. The results of such work, in turn, can inform future theoretical work. It is through feedback from different approaches that richer and more precise understanding of the self-system is likely to be achieved.
Caveats and Future Iterations
Our intent in this paper was to provide a formal framework for investigating collective properties of the self. Within this framework, it is possible to capture basic and robust features of selfconcept organization and to investigate the consequences of this process. The results of the computer simulations revealed that some processes presumed to be unique to the self may in fact be characteristic of complex systems in general. Like complex dynamical systems in other areas of science, global properties of the self-system emerge from the interaction of basic elements. So although the self is a controlling agent for other psychological processes, it does not need a controlling agent to control its own operation. Nor is the basic configuration of the self-system a passive reflection of incoming information. To the contrary, the emergence of structure in the self-system reflects mutual influences among basic elements and thus can be said to be internally generated. External factors such as social feedback play a role, of course, but they do so by interacting with the intrinsic dynamics of the self-system. This conclusion does not mean that the self-structure is indistinguishable from other psychological structures. As noted at the outset, the self is unique in many important ways that have been documented in empirical research over the years. The self may have built-in values and preferences, for example, reflecting evolutionary considerations such as altruism and social connectedness (cf. Axelrod, 1984; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Beach & Tesser, in press; Buss, 1995; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997) . Unique emotional and motivational mechanisms also play important roles in self-evaluation and in response to external (primarily social) sources of information (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1996; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tesser, 1988) . The self is also intimately linked to other psychological systems, such as bodily processes (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962) , action systems (e.g., Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) , and representations of the social world (e.g., Markus & Sentis, 1983) . The unique aspects of the self-system point to limitations in the analogy between self and society and, more generally, impose constraints on the emergence of collective properties in the self-system. Clearly, then, a simplified characterization cannot hope to capture all the richness and complexity of the features and processes specific to the self-system.
The formal framework we have presented should not be looked on as a substitute for the rich insights generated by other theories and research on the self. To the contrary, considering such insights in light of the present model should enable us to determine which facets of the self are unique and which represent invariant properties that characterize complex systems of all kinds. With this in mind, both the formal approach we have developed here and the empirical approach to self-process should be used to inform one another. Within the cellular automata framework, future researchers should incorporate empirically established processes as additional variables and constraints. We did this to some extent in the present simulations by introducing features such as a twodimensional lattice to represent the relatedness of self-relevant infonnation, a variation in the press for integration to simulate variation in self-awareness or cognitive busyness, and a starting configuration consisting of more positive than negative elements to simulate the positivity bias. Successive iterations of this approach will no doubt introduce yet other important constraints and processes that have been revealed empirically.
The cellular automata framework, meanwhile, provides features and generates results that can benefit subsequent empirical agendas. On the basis of results of the present simulations, for example, future researchers should give explicit consideration to the time dimension in investigating processes and properties of the selfsystem. The temporal spacing of self-relevant information, first of all, may prove to be an important independent variable in such research. Variation in the rate of incoming information, for example, may provide insight into the mode of stability (i.e., static vs. dynamic) characterizing a person's self-system, and it may determine whether a dynamically stable system ultimately rejects incongruent information or instead undergoes structural change to accommodate the infonnation. Second, it is imperative that people's reaction to social feedback and other sources of self-relevant information be assessed on appropriate time scales to discern the system's mode of functioning. In focusing only on the immediate impact of incongruent information, one cannot determine whether self-concept change reflects structural change in the self-system or simply a short-term response in service of dynamic stability. By the same token, the lack of change in the short term might mask beneath-the-surface structural changes in the self-system that become manifest after long periods of time. Restricting one's focus to long-term changes, on the other hand, would blur the distinction between static and dynamic equilibrium, because in both cases there is a tendency for the system ultimately to resist incongruent information from outside the system.
The cellular automata approach obviously oversimplifies the complex cognitive and affective machinery responsible for the emergence and maintenance of self-structure. Although some simplifications are inevitable when attempting to model a highly complex phenomenon, two features of the present model warrant special comment. The first concerns the identity of the elements in the cellular automata. We assumed that each element represents a relatively low-level representation of self, corresponding to specific events, assertions, instances of feedback from others, and so forth. Clearly, when people reflect on themselves, considerably higher level aspects of self come to mind. Thus, people routinely think about their personality traits, domains of personal competence, moral values, and personal goals. This problem does not have an obvious counterpart in cellular automata models of society, where each element is clearly identified as an individual (cf. Nowak et al., 1990) . Although the present model is ultimately defined in terms of low-level elements, it is because of integrative processes that subsystems of the self-structure achieve sufficient coherence to be identified as meaningful higher level aspects of the self. Integrative processes working on the emergent substructures, in turn, could generate even higher level features of the self, and so on, in a manner reflecting progressive integration.
The second feature of the cellular automata model that warrants consideration represents a more serious concern. We assumed that the neighborhood structure in the self-system does not change over time for a given simulation, so that each element has a fixed rather fluid relation to other elements. There is reason to think, however, that any given element can enter into multiple self-structures. "Being agreeable," for instance, can be considered with respect to different sets of elements and take on different meanings and evaluations as a result. In the context of a social relationship, this element of the self is likely considered in relation to such elements as "friendly," "interesting," and "talking rapidly" and so is likely to be evaluated positively. In a leadership context, however, "being agreeable" is more likely to be considered in relation to such self-relevant elements as "acting decisively," "taking charge," and "not wasting time on small talk" and as a result may be evaluated negatively. The model we presented does not allow for such gestalt-like transformations of individual elements.
This basic limitation is shared by cellular automata models of societal processes as well (see Nowak & Vallacher, 1998b) . Clearly, the same individual belongs to different social structures, in each of which he or she may be closely linked to entirely different sets of people. To model this multiplicity of social structures, one can assume that each individual is represented in several social spaces, with each space corresponding to a distinct social structure (e.g., work, family, neighborhood). In an analogous fashion, one can assume that each element of the self-system enters into different structures corresponding to various self-schemata or roles. This assumption suggests that the emergence of selfstructure observed in the present simulations may be specific to particular domains rather than characteristic of the self-system in a global sense. Nonetheless, the generality of the effects observed across different domains suggests that they are generic features of the self-system in any given context.
It is possible, though, to incorporate the possibility of change in the relations among elements into the present model by allowing elements to move within the grid. This feature can be implemented by assuming that there are unoccupied cells. If an element that would otherwise have to change its valence is in the vicinity of an empty cell, it will move to that cell instead of changing its valence. Simulations of such dynamics in societal contexts (Szamrej, 1989) have revealed increased clustering (corresponding to greater differentiation in the present model) and decreased polarization (corresponding to decreased positivity in the present model). The empty cell in this approach corresponds to a barrier in the flow of information. With respect to the self-system, this means that elements separated by an empty cell do not influence each other (i.e., are not directly compared). Note that when such changes take place, they create the potential for subsequent movement of other elements by virtue of creating empty cells in the original neighborhood. The results obtained with this feature present are qualitatively similar to the results obtained in the present model. For this reason and for the sake of simplicity, we did not incorporate the movement option into this preliminary version of the society-of-self model.
In the society-of-self model, elements of the self are portrayed in analogy to individuals in society. Self-integration processes act in a manner similar to social influence, and evaluative self-organization is analogous to the emergence of public opinion (Nowak et al., 1990) . The simplifications used in the development of this model with respect to the self also parallel the simplifications necessary to model social influence processes in cellular automata models of societal structure. At this stage in their development, these models do not capture features of social life such as the emergence of social institutions or the various social hierarchies that organize the fabric of society, hi a like manner, the society-of-self model at present does not provide for the emergence of well-documented self-functions, such as self-esteem maintenance, self-conscious emotions, and selfregulation. Societal applications of cellular automata models do not provide for the content of attitudes, opinions, or interests, but rather ate designed to capture the formal structure of social influence and interdependency. In an analogous manner, the elements of die selfsystem cannot be characterized with respect to their content, but rather are defined with respect to their evaluation and relatedness to one Research relevant to positivity indicates that this tendency goes beyond simply having more positive than negative elements in one's self-concept. It appears instead that people tend to emphasize their strengths (e.g., areas of competence, traits) and to downplay their weaknesses and shortcomings (e.g., Tesser & Campbell, 1983; Showers & Kling, 1996) -even if there is relatively abundant low-level evidence relevant to the latter aspects of self. The society-of-self model illustrates how integrative mechanisms promote evaluative differentiation, but the model does not explain why positive regions of the self tend to achieve prepotence at the expense of negatively valenced regions.
Despite these simplifications and limitations, the society-of-self model is useful for revealing properties of the self-system that are common to complex systems composed of many interconnected elements. Thus, by abstracting from semantic content to formal properties of self-elements, one can gain insight into the emergence of stable self-understanding from the dynamic interplay of initially disordered elements and external influences. And from a strictly empirical point of view, the simulation results are compatible with well-established theory and research on the self. Although this approach is in a preliminary stage of development, it promises to provide a welldefined platform for integrating existing ideas and for testing new predictions regarding the structure and process of the self-system. The society of self serves as a model of qualitative understanding that holds the potential for integrating the self-system with other complex systems in social life and the natural world.
